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In the last three decades, many scholarly articles have critically
examined the constitutionality ofwhat might be called the "architecture"
of governmental - and sometimes nominally private - entities in which
Congress has vested the authority to regulate specific areas of the
economy. In the past decade, there has been a trickle of Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the same issues. By "architecture, " I refer to the
structure and governance of these entities. Noticeably absent from these
discussions has been the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, a
little-known entity created by an Act of Congress in 1975 to promulgate
rules governing the municipal securities markets. This article seeks to
subject the architecture of the MSRB to serious scrutiny. The purpose is
not to weaken municipal securities regulation but to determine whether
seemingly suitable regulation has been achieved at the cost of dubious
constitutionality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Securities Amendments of 1975,' Congress established limited
regulation over municipal securities.2 Congress directed the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to "establish" the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB"). The MSRB was to "propose and
adopt," subject o the approval of the SEC, "rules with respect to transactions
in municipal securities effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities
dealers."3
In this article, I examine the constitutionality of this Congressional
enactment. I do not discuss the constitutional authority of Congress to
establish the MSRB or regulate municipal securities issuers.4 Instead, I
1. Securities Amendments of 1975 (1975 Amendments), Pub. L.No. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97 (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. See id.; Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29)
(2018) (containing the authoritative definition of "municipal security"); see also MUN.
SEC. RULEMAKING BD., MSRB GLOSSARY OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES TERMS 63 (3d ed.
2013), http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/pdfs/MSRB-Glossary-of-Municipal-Securities-Ter
ms-Third%20Edition-August-2013.pdf (explaining that a streamlined definition is that a
municipal security is "a bond, note, warrant, certificate of participation or other
obligation issued by a state or local government or their agencies or authorities (such as
cities, towns, villages, counties or special districts or authorities).").
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (stating that unanswered
questions remain concerning whether the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl.
3, permits Congress to subject state governments or agencies to liability under the anti-
24 Vol. 8:1
UNEXAMTJNED ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
question what might be called the "architecture" by which this obscure
organization5 was created, and I conclude that there is a substantial
possibility that the courts, if faced with a case involving the enforcement of
MSRB rules, would declare the statute unconstitutional on one or more of
three different theories:
First, that if the MSRB were deemed a private, non-governmental entity,
in accordance with its legal form as a Virginia non-profit corporation,6 the
delegation of rule-making authority to this entity violates a constitutional
prohibition against delegation to a private entity.
Second, that if the MSRB, despite its legal form, is deemed a public entity,
the fact that MSRB members are appointed neither by the United States
fraud provisions of the securities laws, and whether, if so, the Eleventh Amendment
would immunize a State - or "arm of the state"); see also id. at 756 ("The immunity
[under the Eleventh Amendment] does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal
corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the State."); Harold S.
Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, 3A SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 8:141 (2d
ed. 2018) (describing an overview of these issues); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial
Federalism and the Short, Happy Life ofMunicipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CoRP. L.
739, 760 (2009).
5. See Tutor Perini Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 842 F.3d 71, 86 n.1 1(1st Cir.
2016) (referring to "something called the 'Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board').
The panel that issued the Tutor Perini opinion had a combined tenure on that court of
thirty-nine years. Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT,
http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). My recent Google News
search of "MSRB" yielded page after page of references to The Bond Buyer, widely
known as the "industry bible" but, by its nature, restricted to a relatively narrow base of
readers, while a search for "MSRB" on The New York Times' website yielded no results,
and a search for "Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board" yielded only passing
references to the MSRB over the past five years. GOOGLE NEWS,
https://news.google.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (follow "Google News" hyperlink;
then search for "MSRB," which should yield "About 5,200 results"); N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (follow "New York Times"
hyperlink; in the upper left-hand corner, search for "MSRB," which should yield zero
results); id. (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (follow "New York Times" hyperlink; in the upper
left-hand corner, search for "Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board," which should
yield 133 results).
6. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION 1 (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.msrb.org/-/media/Files/Goverance/Rest
atedArticlesoflncorporation.ashx?la=en [hereinafter AMENDED AND RESTATED
ARTICLES] (explaining that although Congress, in authorizing the MSRB's
establishment, did not specify the legal form of this entity, the MSRB is a Virginia
nonprofit nonstock corporation); Business Entity Details - Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMMISSION, https://sece
file.scc.virginia.gov/Business/0341001 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018); see also Brief for
Respondent at 65-66, Tennessee Republican Party v. SEC, 863 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-3360/3732), 2016 WL 7386038, at *i, 20, 23 ("[I]ncorporated as a Virginia non-




("U.S.") President nor by the SEC (or any employee thereof) violates the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
Third, that if the MSRB is deemed a public entity, the fact that the
President has no authority to remove MSRB members and (perhaps) is
restricted in his ability to remove SEC Commissioners, who in turn are
restricted in their ability to remove the members of the MSRB, unduly
impinges on the executive powers of the President.7 In addition, I touch on
another important issue: whether MSRB Rule G-17, requiring fairness and
honesty by municipal securities professionals, is unconstitutionally vague
insofar as it prohibits municipal professionals from engaging in "unfair
practices."
This article should not be read to question the need for effective, sound
regulation of the market for municipal securities. I ask, instead, whether,
even if the MSRB has provided precisely this kind of regulation, the price
should be a legislative scheme of questionable constitutionality? In the
words of Justice Sutherland in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,9 "nothing is more
certain than that beneficent aims, however great or well directed, can never
serve in lieu of constitutional power."'o
Part II of this article summarizes recent trends in constitutional analysis
and litigation involving challenges to the constitutional structure of
administrative agencies. Part III treats the background of the establishment
of the MSRB and its salient features for the purposes of the constitutional
issues raised. In Part IV, I discuss the nondelegation doctrine, and, in
particular, the version of the doctrine that deals with delegation of rule-
making authority to private entities. Part V deals with the constitutionality
of the appointment of MSRB members under the Appointments Clause. Part
VI discusses the restrictions on the ability of the President to affect the
removal of members of the MSRB. Part VII discusses possible remedies if
the MSRB statute were declared unconstitutional under one or more of the
theories discussed.
II. THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE CONCERNING
ADMINISTRATIVE ARCHITECTURE
For several decades what may be deemed the architectural aspects of
federal administrative law have been in a state of increased constitutional
scrutiny both by scholars and courts. For example, just with respect to the
7. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
9. 298 U.S. 238, 291-92 (1936) (holding that the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority o private entities).
10. Id at 291.
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nondelegation doctrine, which posits that Congress may not delegate
legislative authority," many articles have discussed this doctrine.12 There
have also been numerous articles on the other two doctrines discussed in this
article: restrictions on the President's appointment and removal powers.3
Although many of the authors have been of a "conservative" bent, and thus
might be assumed - correctly or not - to be "anti-regulation," this is not
uniformly the case, as a review of the articles (if not the authors) cited in
notes 12 and 13 will confirm. Moreover, even those who might be "pro-
regulation" cannot ignore cogent arguments coming from those with whom
they may fundamental philosophical disagreements. While these articles are
not of one piece, they generally share an inclination to breathe life into the
doctrines that, together, deal with the balance of power between Congress
and the President over who gets to run administrative agencies, a subject that,
generally, pro-regulation analysts may have been more willing to ignore or
consider dead and buried.14 Meanwhile, there have been several recent
Supreme Court decisions dealing, directly or indirectly, with all three of the
doctrines discussed in this article.'
11. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) (upholding
congressional delegation of authority to Attorney General temporarily to add new drugs
to status of "controlled substance").
12. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-17 (1982); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 146
(2000); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 371-72
(2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1725-29 (2002); James M. Rice, Note, The Private Nondelegation
Doctrine: Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and
International Organizations, 105 CAL. L. REV. 539, 544-56 (2017); David Schoenbrod,
The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223,
1229-37 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 303, 349-50 (1999) [hereinafter Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317-21 (2000); Alexander
Volokh, The New Private Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and
Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 933, 936, 955-56 (2014); Keith
E. Whittington & Jason luliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L.
REv. 379, 392-405 (2017).
13. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1994) (discussing the theory of "unitary
executive," including restrictions on the President's authority to remove federal
officials); John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX REV.
201, 207 (2014) (discussing the meaning of the term "officers of the United States" in
Appointments Clause).
14. See sources cited supra notes 12-13.
15. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (holding the appointment of
administrative law judge by agency employees violated the Appointments Clause); Free
Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (finding
that the restriction of the President's "ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn
2019 27
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Amidst this wealth of academic discussion and litigation, there has been
sparse academic discussion of the MSRB; the few articles that have dealt
with the MSRB have focused almost exclusively on the substance of
municipal securities regulation, such as mandatory disclosure and "pay-to-
play,"16 but not on the constitutionality of the structure and governance of
the MSRB.17 Meanwhile, there has been a near dearth of case law discussing
such issues." The MSRB's relatively low profile in academia may be due
restricted in his ability to remove inferior officer . . . that determines policy and enforces
law[,]" contravenes constitutional separation of powers); see also Dep't of Transp. v.
Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233-34 (2015) (finding that Amtrak was a public
entity, reversing lower court decision declaring Congress' vesting rule-making authority
to private entity unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to private entity).
16. See, e.g., Robert W. Doty & John E. Peterson, The Federal Securities Laws and
Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 283, 286, 294 (1976);
Gabaldon, supra note 4, at 740; Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal
Securities: Issues in Implementation, 13 J. CORP. L. 65, 67 (1987); Ann Judith Gellis,
Municipal Securities Market: Same Problems No Solutions, 21 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 427
(1996) [hereinafter Municipal Securities Market]; Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of
"Pay-to-Play" and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities
Industry, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 489, 517 (1999); Joel Seligman, The Municipal
Disclosure Debate, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 647, 650-51 n.14 (1984); Marc I. Steinberg,
Municipal Issuer Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 6 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-
80 (1980).
17. But see Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a "Heavily Controlled Component" of
the SEC?: An Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. Rev.
361, 363 (2010) (stating, before the Supreme Court decision in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010), that "[a] ruling that the PCAOB is
unconstitutional may also subject the [MSRB] ... to new constitutional scrutiny");
Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 1043 n.392 (2005) (citing Blount v.
SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (discussing whether MSRB is properly deemed
a public entity, subject to constitutional requirements). There has been no follow-up
after the Supreme Court decisions in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) and Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225
(2015). Also worthy of mention are three other articles, one published before the Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) decision, and
two after. See also Robert Botkin, FINRA and the Developing Appointments Clause
Doctrine, 17 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 627, 637 (2017) (considering the
possibility that FINRA structure violates the Appointments Clause); Roberta S. Karmel,
Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government
Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 196 (2008) (concluding that SROs should not
- but could, under the law - be considered government agencies); Joseph McLaughlin,
Is FINRA Constitutional, 12 ENGAGE 111, 113 (2011) (concluding that, at least to the
extent that FINRA engaged in executive functions - investigating and enforcing FINRA
rules and the securities laws among securities broker-dealers - FINRA should be
deemed unconstitutional because of the inability of the SEC to remove FINRA members,
even for cause, and excepting the MSRB from this analysis because it lacks executive
power).
18. But see Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 939-40, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that MSRB Rule G-37, which "restrict[s] the ability of municipal securities professionals
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to the fact that the MSRB, unlike other self-regulatory organizations like the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), lacks the authority to
investigate or enforce its own rules,'9 and to the fact that the municipal
securities market is dwarfed by the equity and other bond markets.20 But
even if the MSRB has little or no "pizzazz," it definitely has significance.
Its regulations2' heavily influence an important governmental function - the
issuance by local and state governments and agencies of securities used to
finance the construction and redevelopment of a wide range of facilities and
edifices - as well as the active, large secondary market for those securities.
MSRB regulations affect the cost of financing for municipal entities by
requiring underwriters to charge them "fair" prices,22 as well as the integrity
to contribute and to solicit contributions to the political campaigns of state officials from
whom they obtain business[,]" passed constitutional muster under the First and Tenth
Amendments); id. at 941 (rejecting the MSRB's argument that it was "a purely private
organization," and finding that "MSRB Rule G-37 operates not as a private compact
among brokers and dealers but as federal law;" no subsequent reported case has reviewed
this decision for its broader implications concerning the constitutionality of the MSRB).
19. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 47.
20. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 1
n.1 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/files/munireport0731 2.pdf (estimating that in 1975
$235.4 billion of municipal securities were outstanding, after the issuance of $58 billion
in municipal securities during that year); Bond Market Size Vs. [sic] Stock Market Size,
ZACK'S, https://finance.zacks.com/bond-market-size-vs-stock-market-size-5863.html
(last updated May 14, 2018) (providing data from SIFMA for 2017) (despite its growth,
the market for municipal securities is dwarfed by the markets for U.S. equities ($30
trillion), U.S. Treasury debt ($14.4 trillion), mortgage bonds ($9.2 trillion), and corporate
bonds ($8.8 trillion)); see Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, US
Bond Market Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/resources/
research/us-bond-market-issuance-and-outstanding/ (follow "download" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019) (summarizing that by 2017, the market had grown to an estimated
$3.85 trillion in outstanding municipal securities, with issuance during that year of
$448.1 billion); CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (to compare
the same number from two different years and eliminate the effects of inflation, multiply
the relevant number from earlier year by amount of inflation between then and
comparison year) (adjusted for inflation, the amount of outstanding municipal securities
in 2018 was 3.68 times the 1975 amount, while the amount of issuance was 1.73 times
the 1975 amount).
21. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE BOOK IX [hereinafter RULE BOOK]
http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/pdfs/MSRB-Rule-Book-October-1-2018.pdf (last updated
Oct. 1, 2018) (explaining that since 1975 the MSRB has promulgated dozens of rules
governing the market for municipal securities). Moreover, the MSRB now operates with
a nearly $40,000,000 annual budget. See GARY HALL & LYNNETTE KELLY, MUN. SEC.
RULEMAKING BD., EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING
OCTOBER 1, 2018 4 [hereinafter BUDGET SUMMARY], http://www.msrb.org/~/media
/Files/Resources/MSRB-Executive-Budget-Summary-FY-2019.ashx?la=en (last visited
Jan. 15, 2019) (stating the MSRB now operates with a nearly $40,000,000 annual
budget).
22. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON DRAFT
2019 29
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and liquidity of the secondary markets for these securities, by requiring more
transparency in a notoriously opaque marketplace.2 3
III. MUNICIPAL SECURITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MSRB
A. Regulation ofMunicipal Securities
Unlike the intensive regulation of stocks and corporate bonds, municipal
securities remain subject to relatively sparse federal regulation. In a
reflection of the very essence of our federal structure,24 municipal securities
have always occupied an anomalous position under the federal securities
laws. On the one hand, since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act"),25 municipal securities have been statutorily exempt from
the registration provisions of that Act,2 6 meaning that municipal entities do
not have to file registration statements with the SEC before they can offer
municipal securities for sale in a public offering;27 further, sales of these
securities, unlike corporate securities, may occur without an "effective"
registration statement containing a prospectus - a comprehensive
disclosure document whose contents are established by the SEC.28 On the
other hand, municipal securities, like all securities, have always been subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act29 and the Exchange Act.30
Thus, before 1975 the SEC was able to enforce those provisions by lawsuits
or administrative proceedings against municipal securities professionals (and
AMENDMENTS TO 2012 INTERPRETIVE NOTICE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF MSRB
RULE G-17 TO UNDERWRITERS OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES 45 (Nov. 16, 2018),
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General//media/18AC7
02913AO4ABF86733318BB13606B.ashx?.
23. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., MILESTONES IN MUNICIPAL MARKET
TRANSPARENCY THE EVOLUTION OF EMMA 18 (2018), http://www.msrb.org/Market-
Topics/~/media/B6A5FFA809C34A7F9DA5C89E8A5FO68 1.ashx?.
24. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (describing "dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government").
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1933).
26. See id. § 77c(a)(2) (listing classes of exempt securities); see also id. § 77f
(outlining registration requirements for non-exempt securities and transactions).
27. See id. §§ 77c, 77f(c).
28. Id § 77f(a)-(b). But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b) (2018) (stating that
disclosure is required of municipal securities issuances and requiring underwriters of
municipal securities underwriters to obtain issuers' "official statements" (akin to
prospectuses) for the securities they intend to sell and provide them to purchasers). See
generally EMMA, https://emma.msrb.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (compiling official
statements now on the MSRB's EMMA website which also contains post-issuance
trading data).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b) (1994) (Supp. 1995); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
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an occasional action against a municipal securities issuer), and purchasers or
sellers could enforce the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act through
an implied right of action.3' Since 1975 at least, municipal securities issuers
have become subject o claims under the Exchange Act.3 2 This enactment
presumably removed any basis for concluding that state and local
governments and their agencies could not be liable under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78(j)(b), or rule lOb-5
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.1Ob-5.3 3
Federal intervention in this market resulted in large part from the collapse
of the market for securities issued by the City of New York.3 4 Municipal
securities markets had been marked by opaqueness favoring insiders and a
lack of disclosure to investors.35 One commentator's claim that "[d]isclosure
31. See 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12:197 n.3 (7th ed. 2016) (stating that while there is a long-recognized implied private
right of action under the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, the vast majority of cases have concluded that no such right
exists under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), the anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act).
32. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976) (redefining "person" as "a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a
government"), with 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1933) (defining person as "a corporation, a
partnership, an association, a joint stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated
organization").
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). But see Margaret V.
Sachs, Are Local Governments Liable Under Rule 10b-5? Textualism and Its Limits, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 56 (1992) (discussing the likely effects these regulations will have on
local governments). However, this author's argument has not gained traction in the
courts or in academia. For example, her article has never been cited in any case available
on Westlaw, and has been cited as an outlier in articles. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairchild and
Nan S. Ellis, Rule 15c2-12: A Flawed Regulatory Framework Creates Pitfalls for
Municipal Issuers, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 587, 592 n.26 (2000) (citing for the
proposition that 1975 Amendments subjected municipalities to liability under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, and citing Sachs article with "But see" signal).
34. See generally H.R. REP. No. 95-040, at 1 (1977) (reviewing the key events in the
New York City debacle); Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The
New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119, 1119 (1976) (concluding that, for some time, New
York City's expenses had exceeded its revenues, but, to appear to balance its budget and
to avoid reforming its fiscal policies and structure, the City resorted to borrowing short-
term to pay its current expenses. Doing so just enabled the City to kick the can down the
road for ever-shorter distances and postponed the inevitable inability to attract new loans
needed to pay off expiring debt. The end came in March 1975, in light of deep concerns
that any more short-term debt was marketable, when the City's major banks - its
underwriters - refused to issue any more short-term debt to finance the deficit).
35. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM., REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET V,
115 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073 1 12.pdf (stating that
the SEC described the secondary market for municipal securities as "a decentralized
over-the-counter dealer market that is illiquid and opaque," resulting in "relatively high
overall levels of markups and other transaction costs . . ." as late as 2012).
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was not required and nonexistent"36 is hardly an overstatement. In late 1974
and early 1975, for example, New York City issued $4.8 billion of notes
(short-term securities), but "[n]o offering document was disseminated to
investors in connection with the sale of City securities until March 13, 1975,"
when a rudimentary "Report of Essential Facts" was distributed.3 7
In the wake of the New York City debacle, and to prevent further
"proliferation of fraudulent trading practices resulting in substantial osses to
public investors, . . . represent[ing] a serious threat to the integrity of the
capital-raising system upon which local governments rely to finance their
efforts,"38 Congress enacted the first federal legislation in U.S. history
dealing with this important marketplace.3 9  As part of the legislation,
Congress required the SEC to establish a new entity, the MSRB.
B. The Establishment of the MSRB
As a preliminary matter, the 1975 Amendments were careful to make clear
that issuers of municipal securities - state and local governments and
agencies - were not made subject o direct regulation by the SEC or the
newly created MSRB.4 0 Thus, aside from the creation of the MSRB, the only
major change in municipal securities regulation was a provision that barred
"municipal securities dealers" (basically, banks or bank departments dealing
in such securities) from using interstate commerce for transactions in
municipal securities unless registered as such with the SEC, bringing them
in line with securities brokers and dealers; registration of "municipal
advisors" was added in 2010.41
Congress instructed the SEC to "establish" a new entity, the MSRB, to
"propose and adopt rules" governing "transactions in municipal securities
36. Municipal Securities Market, supra note 16, at 428.
37. See H.R. REP.NO. 95-040, at 641.
38. S. REP. No. 94-75, at 38 (1975).
39. Securities Amendments of 1975 (1975 Amendments), Pub. L.No. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
40. See The Tower Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (1976) (prohibiting the
SEC and the MSRB from requiring municipal securities issuers to submit information to
them prior to the sale of securities); § 78o4(d)(2) (prohibiting the MSRB from requiring
any municipal issuer to furnish it, or any purchasers or prospective purchasers, with any
information either before or after the sale of securities); see also S. REP.No. 94-75, at 1,
44 (stating that in enacting the Tower Amendment, Congress was being "mindful of the
historical relationship between the federal securities laws and issuers of municipal
securities"); id. at 44 (showing that this "mindfulness" was prominently displayed in the
sub-heading in the Senate Report introducing a discussion of the Tower Amendment:
"REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS-NOT
ISSUERS"). But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2018).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers."42 Congress
required that the rules enacted by the MSRB
be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
municipal securities[,] . . . to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market in municipal securities[,] . . . and, in
general, to protect investors ... and the public interest; and not be
designed to permit unfair discrimination among customers, municipal
entities, obligated persons, municipal securities brokers, municipal
securities dealers, or municipal advisors, to fix minimum profits, to
impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts,
or other fees to be charged by municipal securities brokers, municipal
securities dealers, or municipal advisors, to regulate by virtue of any
authority conferred by this chapter matters not related to the purposes of
this chapter or the administration of the Board, or to impose any burden
on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes
of this chapter.43
The Exchange Act subjects all rules issued by securities self-regulatory
agencies, including the MSRB, to SEC approval.44 In addition, the SEC
retains the power under the Exchange Act to amend MSRB rules through its
own notice and comment rulemaking.45 In the meantime, Exchange Act
section 15A(f) 4 6 prohibits the FINRA from adopting rules applicable to
transactions in municipal securities, and the SEC itself is given no original
authority to promulgate rules over the municipal securities market.
The structure for enforcement of MSRB rules is wholly different than that
for enforcement of FINRA rules. The MSRB itself was given no
enforcement authority - rather, "[i]nspection and enforcement [of
the MSRB rules] [are] the responsibility of the NASD [now FINRA], the
banking agencies, and the SEC."47 FINRA enforces its own rules (and
42. Id §§ 78o-4(b)(1)-(2); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(3) (2018) (adding a provision enabling the MSRB
to "establish information systems"); BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 21, at 6 (referencing
that the MSRB now operates the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) website,
among other electronic information systems).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C) (2018) (requiring that the MSRB's rules assure the
operational capability, competence, experience and training of municipal securities
professionals, and prescribe rules governing the form and content of distributed
quotations and related matters).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(1).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(f).
47. S. REP. No. 94-75. at 47 (1975).
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applicable securities law provisions) through its own disciplinary
proceedings, but FINRA's rules are not enforceable by the SEC and thus
cannot give rise to SEC or criminal proceedings.48 But there is a further
wrinkle unique to the MSRB: the 1975 Amendments included a provision
making virtually any market professional's violation of any MSRB rule (so
long as it involves interstate commerce) a violation of that Act, 4 9 which can
lead to civil or administrative enforcement actions by the SEC, FINRA or
the relevant banking agencies,50 or even criminal charges.5 '
Significantly, section 78o-4(c)(1) does not establish any requirement
concerning the actor's state of mind: presumably, an MSRB rule based on
strict (blameless) liability could qualify as a violation of the Exchange Act
and therefore become grist for the enforcement mill. This feature
accentuates the need for the rules to meet constitutional standards, including
not being unduly vague, which is a risk present in at least one MSRB rule,
G-17.52 For example, the terms "fairly" and "unfair" are not defined in the
48. See Saad v. SEC, 873 F.3d 297,299 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (upholding FINRA sanction
against person associated with broker-dealer and describing the FINRA disciplinary
process, including SEC and appellate court review of FINRA sanctions).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1) ("No broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer shall
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect
any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any municipal
security, and no broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, or municipal advisor shall
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to provide
advice to or on behalf of a municipal entity or obligated person with respect o municipal
financial products, the issuance of municipal securities, or to undertake a solicitation of
a municipal entity or obligated person, in contravention of any rule of the Board. A
municipal advisor and any person associated with such municipal advisor shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty to any municipal entity for whom such municipal
advisor acts as a municipal advisor, and no municipal advisor may engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which is not consistent with a municipal advisor's
fiduciary duty or that is in contravention of any rule of the Board.").
50. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, SEC v. Rhode Island Commerce Corp., No. 1:16-cv-
00107 (D.R.I. Mar. 7, 2016) (charging underwriter with violation of section 78o-4(c)(1)
for the underwriter's violation of two MSRB rules).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (criminalizing willful violations of Exchange Act or of rules
thereunder); United States v. Rudi, 927 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing
an indictment under section 78o4(c)(1) on ground that alleged kickback from underwriter
not sufficiently connected to specific bond transaction to constitute violation).
52. RULE BOOK, supra note 21, at 155 (last updated Oct. 1, 2018) ("In the conduct
of its municipal securities or municipal advisory activities, each broker,
dealer, municipal securities dealer, and municipal advisor shall deal fairly with alpersons
and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice."); Rule G-1 7, MSRB,
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-1 7.aspx?
tab=2#_DA15225F-907A-43CC-A319-26F55EFFDECE (last updated May 4, 2017)
(stating that the MSRB has called Rule G-17 "the core of [its] investor protection rules");
id. (discussing how a violation can be based solely on "fail[ing to] deal fairly with [any]
person[ ]" or "engag[ing] in any ... unfair practice," - that is, such a violation can
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Rule or in the multitudinous guidance on Rule G-17 published by the
MSRB.53 Therefore, there is a need to ascertain whether the terms "fairly"
and "unfair," which, by their nature, are broad, inherently vague terms, are
overly so, and therefore are unconstitutionally vague. There is no case law
defining the state of mind required in a G- 17 claim alleging solely unfairness
or lack of fairness. If scienter - "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud"54 - is not required for such a claim, this should
increase the likelihood of the Rule's being held unconstitutionally vague.55
C. Structure and Governance of the MSRB
In the 1975 Amendments, Congress provided that the MSRB would be
initially composed of fifteen members appointed by the SEC, and that, before
the expiration of an initial two-year term, the existing Board members, not
the SEC, were to elect new members.56 Congress also directed that the
MSRB promulgate rules concerning the membership of the Board, including
the requirement that
the public representatives hall be subject to approval by the Commission
to assure that no one of them is associated with any broker, dealer, or
municipal securities dealer and that at least one is representative of
investors in municipal securities and at least one is representative of
issuers of municipal securities.57
This requirement - that the SEC approve "public" members - was
eliminated in 2010 by an amendment o the Exchange Act contained in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.5 8
Meanwhile, the By-Laws of the MSRB contain no reference to SEC approval
or clearance of public members, and thus all Board positions, as vacancies
occur, are filled by the Board, without any involvement by the SEC or any
other government agency.
occur even in the absence of a charge of "deceptive" and "dishonest" conduct).
53. See Rule G-17, supra note 52.
54. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
55. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
499 (1982) (holding the municipal ordinance not unconstitutionally vague because
violation requires scienter and "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness,
especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is
proscribed.").
56. Securities Amendments of 1975 (1975 Amendments), Pub. L.No. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97, 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(B) (amended 2010).
58. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. 111-203, § 975(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78o-4(b)(2)(B)).
59. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., BY-LAWS 1-4 (May 1, 2018), http://www.ms
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The members of the MSRB may be removed from office by the SEC, but
only for serious cause and after notice and the opportunity for hearing.6 0 No
other officer or employee of the federal government has any role in the
removal of MSRB members.6 '
IV. HAS CONGRESS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE MSRB?
A. Nondelegation Doctrine
The "nondelegation" doctrine, in its purest form, states "that Congress
may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of
Government."62  The doctrine stems from Article I, Section 1 of the
Constitution, which states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States," and is an expression of the
principle of separation of powers among the three branches of the Federal
Government.63
It is traditionally observed that in only two cases - both in 1935 - has
the Supreme Court ever declared an act of Congress to be unconstitutional
under this doctrine,64 which led one prominent scholar to quip in 1999 that
the doctrine has had "One Good Year, Two Hundred and Two Bad Years. "65
Yet scholars have criticized these two cases, for good reason, for making it
far from certain exactly what the contours of this doctrine really are,66 and
rb.org/~/media/Files/Goverance/By-Laws.ashx?la=en (providing for "21 members who
are knowledgeable of matters related to the municipal securities markets," of whom 11
are to be public representatives and 10 persons associated with brokers, dealers,
municipal securities dealers and municipal advisors).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(8) (authorizing the SEC to remove an MSRB member
found to have "willfully (A) violated any provision of this chapter, the rules and
regulations thereunder, or the rules of the Board or (B) abused his authority").
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991) (upholding
congressional delegation of authority to Attorney General temporarily to add new drugs
to status of "controlled substance").
63. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
64. See A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(voiding congressional delegation to private trade or industrial associations' authority to
establish, subject to President's approval, "codes of fair competition" for their industry);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 389 (1935) (voiding, for lack of standards,
congressional grant of authority to President o ban transportation of petroleum products
in violation of state limits). But see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317-18
(1936) (invalidating part of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act on the grounds
congress overstepped its bounds trying to regulate industry within a state); see also infra
text accompanying notes 86-93.
65. Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, supra note 12, at 330.
66. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 12, at 370-71 ("While the cases are major historical
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there is even some debate as to whether there even is (or has been) a
nondelegation doctrine.67
To start with, determining what is "legislative authority" has frequently
bedeviled the courts of the U.S. Chief Justice Marshall, identified the
problem almost two hundred years ago in Wayman v. Southard:6 8
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of
the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject
of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter
unnecessarily.69
The Court has seemingly forever been in search for a meaningful
overriding standard to determine whether the authority that has been
delegated is "legislative." 70 Although Wayman could be, and was, decided
on a statutory analysis, which made discussion of the nature of a "legislative"
delegation unnecessary, Chief Justice Marshall chose to discuss at length the
defendant's argument that Congress had engaged in an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to the federal courts.7 ' He suggested this
rule for identifying legislative power:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill
up the details. To determine the character of the power given to the Courts
by the Process Act, we must inquire into its extent.72
and doctrinal events, they shed little light on the proper methodology for analyzing
nondelegation problems.").
67. Whittington & luliano, supra note 12, at 381 (stating that the nondelegation
doctrine is a "myth," because "there was never a time in which the courts used the
nondelegation doctrine to limit legislative delegations of power."); Jason luliano & Keith
E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
619, 620 (2017) (claiming that "despite the doctrine's disappearance at the federal level,
it has become an increasingly important part of state constitutional law" and concluding
"[c]ontrary to the conventional wisdom, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and well,
albeit in a different location.").
68. 23 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1825) (holding that state law providing that state-created
currency could be used to pay judgments was inapplicable in the execution of a judgment
from a federal court).
69. Id. (stating that the Act of Congress authorizing federal courts to alter regulations
concerning executions on judgments is not a delegation of legislative authority).
70. See, e.g., Whittington & luliano, supra note 12, at 384-88 (discussing the
nondelegation doctrine and how the Court used it prior to the New Deal).
71. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42-47.
72. Id at 43.
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This language has been described by one scholar "as the Court's most
sophisticated treatment of the [nondelegation doctrine]."73 The suggested
standard, while certainly not a bright-line rule - being somewhat akin to
Justice Stewart's vague standard, announced when he famously declined to
define "hard core pornography" except by saying "I know it when I see it" 7 4
- at least has the virtue of being based on the underlying nature of the
authority being delegated: "important subjects . . . must be entirely regulated
by the legislature itself," whereas "[subjects] of less interest, [may be
regulated by] . . . a general provision .. . and power given to those who are
to act under such general provisions to fill up the details."
But the standard suggested in Wayman has gone into disfavor and has not
been applied since 1928, when the Court upheld the delegation to the
President the power to fix customs duties on certain products because the
enabling legislation included "an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform."7 6 The "intelligible
principle" standard, by focusing on the extent to which Congress has
provided adequate guidance to the delegatee, tends to avoid deciding
whether legislative authority has, in fact, been delegated, which, since at
least Wayman, has been said to be strictly prohibited. " Thus, given the
looseness of the "intelligible principle" standard, it is no surprise that the
Supreme Court has routinely approved delegation schemes where it finds
Congress has satisfied this very low hurdle.
73. Lawson, supra note 12, at 357.
74. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43.
76. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding
delegation to President he power to fix customs duties).
77. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42 ("It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to
the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative."); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)
(upholding delegation to President duty to raise tariffs on specified goods where
reciprocal tariffs imposed by other countries were "deemed . . . unequal and
unreasonable" because it was consistent with the principle "[t]hat Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the president").
78. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1934) (providing the
Federal Radio Commission with licensing and regulatory powers over the radio industry,
according to the Commission's view of the "public convenience, industry or necessity");
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (amended by An Act
to Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-729, 56 Stat. 765)
(providing for the Federal Price Administrator to set maximum prices for rent and
commodities, "which 'in judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate
the purposes of this Act' when, in his judgment, their prices 'have risen or threaten to
rise to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this Act"'); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (finding the Emergency Price Control Act
constitutional); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (finding the
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If the delegation of legislative authority is forbidden, then, logically, the
standard to determine whether a delegation has occurred should not be
whether Congress has provided the delegatee and the courts some (or even
any) basis for deducing the breadth and scope of the delegated authority.
Rather, such determination should be based on whether the delegated
authority is legislative in nature. But given the vagueness and looseness of
Congressional directives that have been upheld using the "intelligible
principle" test, it would appear that the standards provided in the 1975
Amendments to guide the MSRB are sufficiently "intelligible" to survive
attack under the nondelegation doctrine. This has been the result to
challenges to the delegation of regulatory authority to the NASD, a
predecessor of FINRA.79
Nevertheless, that conclusion necessarily rests on one of two assumptions:
either that the MSRB is acting as a governmental entity when it adopts a rule,
or that the real delegatee is the SEC, which must approve all MSRB rules to
make them effective. But what if the MSRB were regarded as the delegatee
and that its legal form-a non-profit corporation organized under state law-
were recognized for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of the
delegation? If that were the case, then, under the cases, the delegation of
rule-making power to the MSRB might still be unconstitutional.so
B. Delegation to Private Entities
There is a loosely-defined constitutional doctrine, theoretically separate
from the "plain vanilla" nondelegation doctrine, that says that legislative
authority may not be vested in a private entity." This doctrine finds its
source not in concern about Congress' delegating to another branch of
government the job of establishing or fleshing out a particular set of rules,
but rather about its delegating legislative authority o an entity other than one
of the three branches of the federal government. This species of delegation
raises issues of non-accountability and similar concerns, and has been
questioned by courts and scholars both because it might violate due process
Communications Act of 1934 constitutional).
79. See, e.g., Sorrell v. SEC, 679 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing a suit
challenging a $6,000 fine for selling unregistered securities); Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557
F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1977) (addressing a breach of fair practices); R.H. Johnson &
Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 694-95 (2d Cir. 1952) (addressing the reviewability of the
NASD decision by the courts). In none of these decisions was there an extensive
discussion of the delegation issue.
80. See infra pp. 56-58 (discussing whether the MSRB should be deemed a private
entity).




and because, under the Constitution, federal governmental power must be
vested in one of the three coordinate branches.82
At least one court, a panel of the D.C. Circuit, has criticized the distinction
between the two sources (due process or delegation to other than a federal
governmental entity) of this doctrine: "[w]hile the distinction evokes
scholarly interest, neither party before us makes this point, and our own
precedent describes the problem as one of unconstitutional delegation. And,
in any event, neither court nor scholar has suggested a change in the label
would effect a change in the inquiry."83 But academia takes this distinction
seriously. If a delegation of governmental authority to a private entity is
constitutionally problematic, given the jurisprudence on this issue,84 such a
delegation raises issues concerning the propriety of the delegation to a non-
government agency, department or branch, rather than due process. This
conclusion is based on the fact that while some of the concerns with private
delegation rest on the unfairness of vesting a private interest with rule-
making authority over its competitors, it is not necessary that this feature be
present to make delegation to a private entity offensive, because, even
without arming a private actor with the power to harm its competitors,
vesting rule-making authority in a private entity is undemocratic and serves
to obscure responsibility and accountability."
The issue of whether Congress may vest rule-making authority in a private
entity has its own pedigree. In Eubank v. City ofRichmond,8 6 the Court held
that a local ordinance allowing owners of two-thirds of the properties on a
street to make a zoning rule defining setbacks was a violation of the due
process rights of those property owners affected by the rule. While
82. Compare Froomkin, supra note 12, at 146 ("In contrast to the separation of
powers concerns that animate the public nondelegation doctrine, the private
nondelegation doctrine focuses on the dangers of arbitrariness, lack of due process, and
self-dealing when private parties are given the use of public power without being
subjected to the shackles of proper administrative procedure."), and Volokh, supra note
12, at 933, 936 (delegation to private entities generates due process, not separation of
powers, issue), with Rice, supra note 12, at 544-56 (vesting legislative authority in a
private entity violates Constitution's "vesting" clauses, entrusting federal government's
powers exclusively to the three branches).
83. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2013), vacated and remanded, Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225
(2015).
84. See discussion infra notes 86-109.
85. Ass'n ofAm. R.R.s, 721 F.3d at 675 (looking to both concerns -"delegating the
government's powers to private parties saps our political system of democratic
accountability" and "disinterested government agencies ostensibly look to the public
good, not private gain.").
86. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
87. Id at 144.
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reserving ruling on whether cities had the power "to establish a building line
or regulate the structure or height of buildings," the Court held that "control
of the property of plaintiff in error by other owners of property, exercised
under the ordinance,.. . is the vice of the ordinance, and makes it, we think,
an unreasonable exercise of the police power."" Similarly, in Washington
v. Roberge,8 9 the Court, citing Eubank, held unconstitutional a local
ordinance requiring approval of two-thirds of neighboring property owners
for the construction of "a philanthropic home for children or for old people,"
on the basis that the property owners' decision was unreviewable and that
the property owners "are not bound by any official duty, but are free to
withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject he trustee
to their will or caprice."90
In the next decade, this doctrine was raised in the Court's decision in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.9' Schechter involved
vesting private industry groups with the authority to set standards of "fair
competition," subject to presidential approval.92 The Court held that the
delegation was void for lack of definiteness, including a failure to define
"fair competition."93 This invoked a version of the traditional nondelegation
doctrine. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the Court was also concerned
about vesting (albeit subject to Presidential approval) rule-making authority
in private entities:
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for
the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade
or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for
that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the
problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made
valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in
section 1 of title 1?94
The Court's immediate response to its own questions was stark: "The
answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our
law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties
88. Id
89. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
90. Id. at 118, 122.
91. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
92. Id at 495-96.
93. Id at 531-32.
94. Id at 537.
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of Congress."95 Whether this statement was dictum or holding - an issue
on which there is academic disagreement9 6 - it is obvious that the Court in
Schechter expressed distaste both with standardless delegation to a
coordinate branch and with vesting authority in a non-government entity.97
This raises the question of whether the Schechter Court's references to both
"delegation" doctrines amount to dictum in light of the narrower, as-applied
ruling under the Commerce Clause.98
A year after Schechter was handed down, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Carter v. Carter Coal CO99 struck down the congressional delegation of
authority to private coal miners and their employees to establish industry-
wide regional wage rates and maximum hours of work in bituminous coal
mining.'0 0 While Carter has justly been criticized for its lack of clarity,'0 '
Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court did not lack in asperity:
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate
the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose
interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business. The record shows that the conditions of competition differ
among the various localities. In some, coal dealers compete among
themselves. In other localities, they also compete with the mechanical
production of electrical energy and of natural gas. Some coal producers
favor the code; others oppose it; and the record clearly indicates that this
diversity of view arises from their conflicting and even antagonistic
95. Id
96. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 12, at 547 n.52.
97. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 542-43 (holding that "the hours
and wages of those employed by defendants in their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn and to
the sales there made to retail dealers and butchers" did not involve transactions in
interstate commerce and thus were not a proper subject of Congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause).
98. See id.
99. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
100. Id at 283-85 (noting that the statute enacted by Congress permitted producers
of two thirds of the coal in any region, with the approval of unions representing a majority
of workers in the region, to set hours and wage standards).
101. See, e.g., Harold J. Kent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and Citizen
Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1823 n.44 (1993) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936)) ("[L]imits of Congress' ability to delegate policymaking outside the
government remain unclear."); Andrew J. Ziaja, Hot Oil and Hot Air: The Development
of the Nondelegation Doctrine Through the New Deal, a History, 1813-1944, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 958 (2008) ("[W]hile the [Carter] Court used the phrase
'legislative delegation' and cited Schechter for its bearing on the nondelegation doctrine,
however, it neither cited Hampton nor raised the faintest whiff of the 'intelligible
principle' test.").
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interests. The difference between producing coal and regulating its
production is, of course, fundamental. The former is a private activity; the
latter is necessarily a governmental function, since, in the very nature of
things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the
business of another, and especially of a competitor. And a statute which
attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and
unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property.
The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is
unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court which
foreclose the question.102
It is not entirely clear whether the base concern in either Schechter or
Carter is that of delegating rule-making authority to a private entity, per se,
which tends to raise structural constitutional issues, or that of delegating rule-
making authority to a private party that can wield that authority against its
competitors, which tends to raise due process issues. And the Court has
never since voided an Act of Congress for delegation of legislative authority
to a private entity.103
The Court has, however, subsequently distinguished Carter in a number
of cases, including, most notably, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins.10 4
In Adkins, the Court upheld the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (Coal Act),'s
which allowed coal producers (members of local boards of producers) to
propose minimum coal prices to the Bituminous Coal Commission, a federal
agency, which could approve, disapprove, or modify the proposals.106 The
Court held the Act constitutional because "members of the [boards]
function[ed] subordinately to the Commission," which, under the Act, was
given comprehensive and detailed "authority and surveillance" over the
producers.0 7 A thorough review of the precise statutory framework under
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 is necessary before one can determine
102. Carter, 298 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912); Washington ex
rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, 122, (1928)).
103. See Rice, supra note 12, at 547-58 (outlining the history of the private
nondelegation doctrine); see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-
delegation Doctrine Returns After Long Hiatus, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2014 8:00 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegation-doctrine-
returns-after-long-hiatus/ ("Regardless of which facet of the non-delegation doctrine one
considers, it has been close to eighty years since the Supreme Court found an
unconstitutional delegation, to either the executive branch or the private sector.").
104. 310 U.S. 381, 396-97 (1940).
105. Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 (Coal Act), ch. 127, Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (expired 1943; repealed 1966).
106. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 388, 404.
107. Id at 392. 399.
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whether Adkins can be meaningfully distinguished when it comes to the
MSRB. 08
It has recently been observed that "[a]lthough this so-called 'private
nondelegation' doctrine has been largely dormant in the years since [being
applied by the Court], its continuing force is generally accepted."109 The first
reawakening of this doctrine was in a dispute concerning the delegation of
rule-making authority concerning the operation of passenger and freight
railroads. 0 A few years later, the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas found fault in the Supreme Court's improper delegation of rule-
making authority by a department of the federal government and private
entities."' More such cases undoubtedly lie ahead.
C. The Amtrak Case
1. Background
In 2008, Congress charged the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
("Amtrak"), a for-profit corporation,"2 and the Federal Railroad
Administration ("FRA"), an agency of the Department of Transportation, to
develop new "metrics and minimum standards for measuring the
performance and service quality of intercity passenger train operations.""3
Amtrak and the FRA were required to put these metrics and standards into
effect, and if they could not agree, the dispute could be settled through
108. See infra notes 167-177 and accompanying text (discussing possible distinctions
between the delegation discussed in Adkins and that involving the MSRB).
109. Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701, 707 (5th Cir. 2017);
see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991)
("Eubank and Roberge remain good law today.").
110. Ass'n ofAm. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1225-26 (2015).
111. Texas v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820, 843-844 (N.D. Tex.) (finding
unconstitutional the interpretation of a statutory requirement that capitation rates be
"actuarially sound" because it delegated the certification of capitation rates to actuaries
credentialed by private entity and following private entity's practice standards), appeal
docketed, No. 18-10545 (5th Cir. May 7, 2018).
112. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit's
analysis of Amtrak's corporate status). See generally AMTRAK NAT'L FACTS,
https://www.amtrak.com/about-amtrak/amtrak-facts/amtrak-national-facts.html?stop m
obi=yes&ref=stop mobile (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) ("Amtrak is a federally chartered
corporation, with the federal government as majority stockholder. The board is appointed
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the US Senate. Amtrak is operated
as a for-profit company, rather than a public authority.").
113. Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-432, § 207(a), 122 Stat. 4907 (codified in scattered sections of49 U.S.C.).
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binding arbitration."14
The D.C. Circuit struck down that provision as an unconstitutional
delegation of authority to a private party, holding that "[f]ederal lawmakers
cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private entity. To do so would be
'legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form."" 5 The court stated that
"[t]his constitutional prohibition is the lesser-known cousin of the doctrine
that Congress cannot delegate its legislative function to an agency of the
Executive Branch."16 The court found two basic purposes for this rule:
"[f]irst, delegating the government's powers to private parties saps our
political system of democratic accountability. . . . Second, fundamental to
the public-private distinction in the delegation of regulatory authority is the
belief that disinterested government agencies ostensibly look to the public
good, not private gain."''7
Despite the prohibition against delegation to private parties, the D.C.
Circuit recognized that "private parties . . . may . .. help a government
agency make its regulatory decisions, for "'[t]he Constitution has never been
regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality' that such schemes facilitate.""' The court framed the
fundamental issue as "[p]recisely how much involvement may a private
entity have in the administrative process before its advisory role trespasses
into an unconstitutional delegation? Discerning that line is the task at
hand."119 Citing factors, such as Congress' giving Amtrak veto power over
the FRA, its vesting a range of authority Amtrak "otherwise unknown in the
law," and its authorizing private arbitrators to settle disputes between
Amtrak and FRA, the court concluded that, since it deemed Amtrak to be a
private party, the delegation of standards-making authority to it was
unconstitutional.120
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit.121 Without deciding (or
discussing) the constitutionality of vesting rule-making authority in a private
party, the Court held "that, for purposes of determining the validity of the
metrics and standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity."122 Based on its
114. Id § 207(d).
115. Ass'n ofAm. R.R.s, 721 F.3d at 670 (quoting Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 311 (1936)).
116. Id (citing U.S. CoNsT., art I, § 1); id. (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935)).
117. Id at 675.
118. Id at 671 (quoting Pan. Ref Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935)).
119. Id
120. Id at 671-74.
121. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015).
122. Id at 1228.
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own detailed "independent inquiry" of "Amtrak's status as a governmental
entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the Constitution,"
the Court found that "Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise" for
those purposes.123  The Court specifically discounted Congress's
declarations to the contrary in Amtrak's enabling legislation.124
The Court summarized its rationale for its finding Amtrak to be a non-
private entity as follows: "The political branches created Amtrak, control its
Board, define its mission, specify many of its day-to-day operations, have
imposed substantial transparency and accountability mechanisms, and, for
all practical purposes, set and supervise its annual budget."125 The Court also
stated:
Among other important considerations, its priorities, operations, and
decisions are extensively supervised and substantially funded by the
political branches. A majority of its Board is appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate and is understood by the Executive to be
removable by the President at will. Amtrak was created by the
Government, is controlled by the Government, and operates for the
Government's benefit. Thus, in its joint issuance of the metrics and
standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for
purposes of the Constitution's separation of powers provisions.126
The Supreme Court decisions in Department of Transportation, Carter,
and Adkins lead to two questions concerning the constitutionality, for
delegation purposes, of the statutory provisions giving rise to the MSRB:
first, whether the MSRB is a private entity; and second, if so, whether vesting
the authority to the MSRB transgressed constitutional limits.
123. Id at 1227, 1231-33.
124. Id at 1233 ("LeBron teaches that ... the practical reality of federal control and
supervision prevails over Congress' disclaimer of Amtrak's governmental status."); see
also 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (2018) ("'Amtrak' . . . shall be operated and managed as a
for-profit corporation. . . ."); § 24301(a)(3) ("'Amtrak ... is not a department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States Government .... "); LeBron v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) ("[W]here, as here, the Government creates
a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains
for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation,
the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.").
125. Dep'tofTransp., 135 S. Ct. at 1233.
126. Id at 1228, 1232-33 (remanding to the D.C. Circuit for resolution of any
"questions respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards-including questions
implicating the Constitution's structural separation of powers and the Appointments
Clause .... "); Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 27, 36, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (holding on remand that "PRIIA violates due process" because it "gives a self-
interested entity regulatory authority over its competitors" and violates the Appointments
Clause because the arbitrator would act as a "principal officer" who required
appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate, as opposed to mere
selection by the Surface Transportation Board).
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2. Is the MSRB a Private or Public Entity?
In Department of Transportation, the Court engaged in a detailed
"independent inquiry" of various aspects of Amtrak's setup to determine
whether to treat it as a private corporation.127 To hazard a reasonable guess
as to how a future court would rule were it faced with whether the MSRB is
a public or private entity for this purpose, one must compare Amtrak and the
MSRB through the various lenses the Court used in Department of
Transportation.
The first category reviewed by the Court was "ownership and corporate
structure."128 On virtually every facet of this issue as it was discussed in
Department of Transportation, MSRB is clearly more appropriately deemed
a private entity than Amtrak:
* Amtrak is a for-profit corporation, most of the common stock and
all of the preferred stock of which is owned by the Secretary of
Treasury.129  The MSRB is a Virginia nonprofit nonstock
corporation, although nothing in the statute authorizing its creation
specified what type of legal entity it would be.3 0
* Eight of the nine voting members of Amtrak's Board are appointed
by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,
and the ninth is the Secretary of Transportation."' The MSRB is,
literally, a self-perpetuating bureaucracy; all new members of the
MSRB are chosen by sitting members of the MSRB.13 2 In 2010,
Congress eliminated the original statutory requirement that he
SEC approve the MSRB's public members.'33
* Amtrak Board salary limits are set by Congress, while there are no
limitations on the compensation of the members of the MSRB
Board.13 4
* Amtrak Board members are removable by the President of the U.S.
127. Dep'tofTransp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231.
128. Dep't of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231-32.
129. 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) ("Amtrak ... shall be operated and managed as a for-
profit corporation."); Dep't of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231-32 (noting Amtrak stock
ownership).
130. See AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES, supra note 6.
131. See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1) (2018); see also § 24302(a)(1)(B); 49 U.S.C. §
24303(a) (2018) (providing that the voting board members elect a non-voting board
member, who acts as Amtrak's President).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 975(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-4(b)(2)(B)).
134. 49 U.S.C. § 24303(b); RULE BOOK, supra note 21, at 375 (Rule A-3).
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without cause,'35 but only the SEC has any power of removal of
MSRB members, and only for cause.13 6
* Amtrak Board members are to be chosen in consultation with
Congress to represent major geographic regions served by
Amtrak,3 7 but there is no requirement that MSRB members be
chosen in consultation with any arm of the federal government;
the only restrictions are with respect to members' professional
affiliation or experience.'38
The second category reviewed by the Court was the Government's
"supervision over Amtrak's priorities and operations." "9 Again, the facets
considered by the Court regarding Amtrak point strongly to the MSRB's
being deemed a private entity.
* Amtrak is required to submit annual reports to Congress and the
President.14 0 There is no such requirement for the MSRB.
* The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") "applies to Amtrak in
any year in which it receives a federal subsidy."14' Amtrak is
required to maintain an inspector general, and Congress holds
frequent oversight hearings over Amtrak budget and operations.14 2
The FOIA does not apply to the MSRB,143 it is not required to
maintain an inspector general, and Congressional oversight of the
MSRB is sparse at best. The MSRB prepares its own budget,
which is not subject to SEC approval.144 Until the start of the fiscal
year in October 2017, the budget was not even made public. 14
135. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231-32 (2015).
136. See also supra text accompanying notes 55-53.
137. Dep't of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231-32.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(F), (G).




143. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2018) (defining "agency" as "each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency . . ."); § 552(a) (stating that FOIA applies to "agencies"); Roberta
Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 151, 183 n.151 (2008) (citing Ind.
Invest. Protect. League v. NYSE, 367 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that
the New York Stock Exchange is not an "agency" under FOIA) (assuming that the
FINRA, another securities self-regulatory authority, is not, unless it were held to be a
government agency).
144. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b) (2018) (listing the powers and abilities of the
board, which include budget-like powers, without stating oversight is required).
145. See Press Release, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., MSRB Publishes Budget
Summary in Support of Financial Transparency (Oct. 17, 2017),
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* Amtrak is required to further specify operational goals set by
Congress, including maintaining a route between Louisiana and
Florida and improving the Northeast corridor pursuant to
specified, detailed Congressionally-mandated priorities.146 The
SEC exercises some control over the MSRB through its power to
approve, disapprove or amend rules adopted by the MSRB and
power to remove its members,14 7 but the MSRB has never been
subject to the kind of specific directives that Congress imposed
over Amtrak. The sole direction to the MSRB consists of a general
description of the goals of the rules.148
* A final factor considered by the Court was that "Amtrak is also
dependent on federal financial support. In its first 43 years of
operation, Amtrak has received more than $41 billion in federal
subsidies. In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion
annually."14 9  The MSRB receives no federal funding, unlike
Amtrak; the vast majority of its revenues come from industry fees,
http://www.msrb.org/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/2017/MSRB-Publishes-Budget-
Summary-in-Support-of-Financial-Transparency.aspx. See generally GARY HALL &
LYNETTE KELLY, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 2018 (2018), http://www.msrb.org/
~/media/Files/Resources/MSRB-Executive-Budget-Summary-FY-2019.ashx?la=en.
146. See Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-432, § 207, 122 Stat. 4907 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
(requiring FRA and Amtrak to, jointly and in consultation with pertinent government
agencies, railroads, employees and others, "develop new or improve existing metrics and
minimum standards for measuring the performance and service quality of intercity
passenger train operations, including cost recovery, on-time performance and minutes of
delay, ridership, on-board services, stations, facilities, equipment, and other services.
Such metrics, at a minimum, shall include the percentage of avoidable and fully allocated
operating costs covered by passenger evenues on each route, ridership per train mile
operated, measures of on-time performance and delays incurred by intercity passenger
trains on the rail lines of each rail carrier and, for long-distance routes, measures of
connectivity with other routes in all regions currently receiving Amtrak service and the
transportation needs of communities and populations that are not well-served by other
forms of intercity transportation."); id § 208 (requiring the FRA to engage an
independent entity to develop and recommend methodologies for Amtrak to use in its
route and service planning decisions); id. § 209 (directing Amtrak's Board to develop a
single system for allocating costs between Amtrak and states supporting rail service); id.
§ 210(a) (ranking its long-distance routes); id. § 210(b) (requiring Amtrak to publicize
on its website a plan to improve performance of such routes, addressing nine specific
factors); Dep't ofTransp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 177-182.
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C) (2018).
149. Dep't of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C).
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while a small amount (less than three percent) come from fines
collected by FINRA and the SEC from violators of MSRB rules.15 0
In sum, a comparative analysis of the factors considered by the Court in
Department of Transportation shows, at the very least, a substantial
possibility that if a court were to subject the MSRB to the same analysis, it
would conclude that the MSRB, unlike Amtrak, is, for these purposes, a
private entity.
3. IfMSRB is a Private Entity, Is the Extent ofDelegation
Constitutional?
If the MSRB is a private entity for "constitutional purposes" of delegation,
that leads to another question under the cases: did Congress go too far in
delegating authority to the MSRB?'5 1
In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, the leading case in this
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
Congress' delegating substantial authority to regulate bituminous coal
pricing and business standards to private entities.15 2 The Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937153 created district coal boards (composed of regional coal
producers who agreed to participate in such boards) to be involved in two
kinds of regulation: setting minimum prices and promulgating standards and
practices.15 4 The district boards were established "to operate as an aid to the
[Bituminous Coal] Commission but [were] subject to its pervasive
surveillance and authority." 5 5 By reason of that "pervasive surveillance and
authority," the Court held that Congress had not "delegated its legislative
authority to the industry."156
My analysis of the Coal Act leads me to conclude that the "delegation" to
the coal boards was more apparent than real, leaving very little, if anything,
to the district boards' discretion. This leads to the inference that the whole
150. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE
YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 AND 2015, AND REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 5, 9 (2016), http://www.msrb.org/msrb l/pdfs/MSRB-Financial-
Statements-FY16.pdf
151. Whether the MSRB could be considered a private entity for delegation purposes
but a public entity for separation purposes is an interesting issue unnecessary to be
resolved in this article; I assume that the MSRB is either a private entity or a public
entity, but cannot be both depending on which constitutional measure is being taken.
152. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
153. Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (expired 1943; repealed 1966).
154. See id. § 1; Adkins, 310 U.S. at 404.
155. Adkins, 310 U.S. at 388.
156. Id at 399.
50 Vol. 8:1
UNEXAPHNED ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
arrangement may very well have been a political compromise designed to
give the appearance of industry involvement while vesting very little real
authority in the private entities. Start with the fact that the Commission could
step in and perform the actions required under the Act if a district board
failed to act, '5 7 and this exact condition arose in the same year the law was
enacted.15 Even without such displacement, however, the authority of the
district boards was substantially cabined.
The district boards were given the authority to "propose" minimum prices
for "kinds, qualities, and sizes of coal produced in said district, and
classification of coal and price variations as to mines, consuming market
areas, values as to uses and seasonal demand in their egion."159 Congress
required that the minimum prices so proposed be calculated to yield a return
"equal as nearly as may be to the weighted average of the total costs, per net
ton" in the local area, and specified eleven categories of costs to be
considered.6 0 The proposed minimum prices were to "reflect, as nearly as
possible, the relative market value of the various kinds, qualifies, and sizes
of coal . . . be just and equitable as between producers within the district . .
and ... have due regard to the interests of the consuming public."161
Additionally, "[n]o minimum price shall be proposed that permits
dumping."16 2 The procedure used by the district boards in formulating the
proposed minimum prices was to conform to rules promulgated by the
Commission.163 The Commission could "approve, disapprove, or modify" a
district board's proposed minimum price schedule.164
After minimum prices were submitted to the Commission, another process
was to occur - coordination of minimum prices with other district boards
"in common consuming market areas," according to standards contained in
the Act.1 6 5 The proposed coordinated prices were to be submitted to the
Commission, which could review and revise them.166
157. Bituminous Coal Act § 6.
158. See infra note 166.






165. Id § 411(b).
166. Id § 41(a); WALDO E. FISHER & CHARLES M. JAMES, MINIMUM PRICE FIXING IN
THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY 53 (1955) http://www.nber.org/books/fish55-1 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2019) (stating that, in practice, the scheme enacted by Congress to
establish coordinated prices at least initially through the district boards proved
unworkable; and in October 1937, when it became apparent that district boards would
20 19 5 1
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The Act also empowered district boards to "propose reasonable rules and
regulations incidental to the sale and distribution, by code members within
the district, of coal."'67 Congress listed thirteen separate "practices with
respect to coal [that] shall be unfair methods of competition and shall
constitute violations of the code."16 8
There appear to be at least two defining differences between the statutory
scheme ruled constitutional in Adkins and the statutory scheme creating the
MSRB. First, the Coal Act expressly permitted the Bituminous Coal
Commission to regulate the affairs of a local district without the involvement
of the district board when it determined that the board had failed to act.16 9
By contrast, the 1975 Amendments endowed the SEC with no such
authority.170 Its responsibility was limited to approving, disapproving, or
amending an SRO's rule.'7' Second, the Coal Act provided detailed
standards governing both the computation of minimum coal prices and the
development of standards governing the coal market.172 By contrast, the
1975 Amendments, at most, set broad goals for the rules the MSRB was to
promulgate. 17' Thus, Congress required MSRB to enact rules "to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices[,] [and] to promote just and
equitable principles of trade,"17 4 but did not go further, as it did in the Coal
Act, to identify the specific acts and practices that should be outlawed to
achieve the goals of preventing fraud and promoting just and equitable trade
practices.7 5 Likewise, the requirement hat MSRB rules "foster cooperation
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
municipal securities" merely states the goal but does not prescribe the means
to achieve the goal.17 6 The same occurred with the mandate to adopt rules
not be completing the process by a deadline established by the Commission, the
Commission assumed the coordination task, acting pursuant to the provision of the Act,
permitting it to take any action authorized or required by the Act upon the failure of a
district board to act); id. (showing that the district boards' role in the price-fixing process
was not necessary to effectuate the statutory purposes).
167. Bituminous Coal Act § 411(a).
168. Bituminous Coal Act § 411(i).
169. Bituminous Coal Act §§ 411(d); 6(a).
170. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (1975 Amendments), Pub. L. No. 94-
29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
171. Id § 19(b)(1).
172. Bituminous Coal Act §§ 4(a)-(b).
173. 1975 Amendments § 2.
174. Id § 15B(b)(2)(C).
175. Bituminous Coal Act § 411(i).
176. Id
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"to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market in municipal securities, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest."' While the legislative details may suffice for particular
mandated rulemakings,17 1 where the issue, at a minimum, is whether
Congress provides the federal agency with an "intelligible principle" how to
act, the guidance is far less detailed, and therefore far more open to the
MSRB's own discretion, than that provided under the Coal Act.1 79 Thus, the
controls over the MSRB fall far short of the kinds of restrictions to which the
Adkins Court looked when it concluded that the coal boards were established
"to operate as an aid to the [Bituminous Coal] Commission but subject to its
pervasive surveillance and authority."s0
In summary, it is fair to conclude that a future Supreme Court could
justifiably distinguish Department of Transportation and hold that the
MSRB is a private entity, and distinguish Adkins and hold that the power
vested in the MSRB, compared to the extent of actual governmental control,
crosses the constitutional line.'' At the very least, these appear to be
substantially closer questions than those considered in both Department of
Transportation and Adkins.
V. IF THE MSRB IS A PUBLIC ENTITY, DOES THE FACT THAT MEMBERS OF
THE MSRB ARE APPOINTED BY OTHER MSRB MEMBERS VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION?
Suppose, despite its formal status as a private entity, the MSRB, like
Amtrak, were deemed a public entity. At least two constitutional issues
would follow. The first would be whether the method by which MSRB
members are appointed - since 1977, new MSRB members have been
appointed by the other members of the Board8 2 - violates the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.'83
The Appointments Clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint . .. all . . . Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
177. Id
178. See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
180. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388 (1940) (emphasis
added).
181. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1227, 1231-33 (2015);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
183. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.184
One who works in the federal government is either an "officer of the United
States" (usually referred to as a "principal officer"), an "inferior officer," or
a mere employee. 5 The Constitution, through the Appointments Clause,
covers only the first two categories.8 6 Thus, if one is an employee, "part of
the broad swath of 'lesser functionaries' in the Government's workforce,...
the Appointments Clause cares not a whit about who named them."1 7 On
the other hand, if one is an officer - principal or inferior - one's
appointment must be made in accordance with the specific procedure
applicable under the Appointments Clause.'
Thus, whether the MSRB's arrangement runs afoul of the Appointments
Clause depends on whether MSRB members are considered mere employees
or "officers." If MSRB members are considered "officers" - even if MSRB
members are deemed "inferior officers"- this method of appointment
violates the Appointments Clause.
A recent, and leading, Supreme Court decision discussing the officer-or-
employee issue is Lucia v. SEC, 8 9 in which the Court held that the
appointment of administrative law judges ("ALJs") by SEC employees
violated the Appointments Clause.190 The Court found that ALJs were
"officers" for purposes of the Appointments Clause.191 ALJs are officers,
not employees, because they "occupy a continuing position established by
law," as opposed to an "occasional or temporary position," and because they
"exercise[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States"
and, in doing so, "exercise ... significant discretion" in doing so.19 2 The
Court stated that the SEC's ALJs "are near-carbon copies" of the tax-court
184. Id
185. See N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 945 (2017) ("' [F]or purposes of
appointment,' the Clause divides all officers into two classes-'inferior officers' and
noninferior officers, which we have long denominated 'principal' officers") (quoting
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879)); Freytag v. Comm'r., 501 U.S. 868,
880-81 (1991) (distinguishing officers and employees).
186. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
187. Id at 2051; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, n.162 (1976) ("'Officers
of the United States' does not include all employees of the United States.... Employees
are lesser functionaries ubordinate to officers of the United States.").
188. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
189. Id
190. Id at 2049.
191. Id
192. Id at 2053-54.
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judges ruled to be "officers" in Freytag v. Commissioner;193 "Freytag says
everything necessary to decide this case" and therefore dispenses with the
need to "elaborate on [the] 'significant authority' test. "194
Since Lucia and Freytag deal with "adjudicative officials"1 95 (i.e. judges),
arguably they have limited application to MSRB members, who issue rules.
Thus, we could look to cases not involving judges to test whether the MSRB
statute violates the Appointments Clause. We need not look further than
Lucia, in which the Court pointed to two other Supreme Court cases -
United States v. Germaine'96 and Buckley v. Valeol97 -which the Court said
"set out [its] basic framework for distinguishing between officers and
employees."198
In Germaine, Congress gave the Commissioner of Pensions the authority
to hire surgeons, who examined pensioners and applicants for pensions and
were paid on a per-examination basis from funds appropriated to pay
pensions.199 A surgeon was indicted for extorting a pensioner under a statute
applying only to "officers of the United States."200 The Court held that
because the surgeon's "duties are not continuing and permanent, and they
are occasional and intermittent," the surgeon was not an officer.201 As the
Court explained,
[t]he surgeon is only to act when called on by the Commissioner of
Pensions in some special case, as when some pensioner or claimant of a
pension presents himself for examination. He may make fifty of these
examinations in a year, or none. He is required to keep no place of
business for the public use. He gives no bond and takes no oath, unless
by some order of the Commissioner of Pensions of which we are not
advised. No regular appropriation is made to pay his compensation ... 202
Buckley dealt with the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC"), of which
four of the six voting members were appointed by the House Speaker (two
members) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (two members).2 03 If
the FEC members were officers, this method violated the Appointments
Clause, because the two members of the Congress were not among the three
193. Id at 2052; Freytag v. Comm'r., 501 U.S. 868, 880-81 (1991).
194. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
195. Id at 2052; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
196. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879).
197. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
198. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
199. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 508-09.
200. Id at 509.
201. See id. at 512.
202. Id
203. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 2 (1976).
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categories of those who may nominate officers (U.S. President, courts of law,
or heads of departments).204 The Court held that "any appointee exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer
of the United States."'20 5 The Court's exposition of this point was largely
limited to stating that FEC commissioners must be characterized as at least
"inferior Officers" if, as was the case, postmasters and district court clerk
were.2 06 The Court also provided this analysis:
"Officers of the United States" does not include all employees of the
United States, but there is no claim made that the Commissioners are
employees of the United States rather than officers. Employees are lesser
functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States, whereas the
Commissioners, appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to the
control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative
authority.207
The Court separately analyzed the powers of the FEC and divided them
into three categories:
[1] functions relating to the flow of necessary information receipt,
dissemination, and investigation; [2] functions with respect to the
Commission's task of fleshing out the statute rulemaking and advisory
opinions; and [3] functions necessary to ensure compliance with the
statute and rules informal procedures, administrative determinations and
hearings, and civil suits.208
It held that the first category of duties, "falling in the same general category
as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its own
committees," did not violate the Appointments Clause.20 9 As to each of the
other two categories, however, the Court found them to "represent[ ] the
performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a
public law;" 2 10 thus, the method of appointing FEC members violated the
clause. The second of the three categories of powers is vested in the
MSRB.
Two lower court pre-Lucia cases may also provide useful guidance. In
Tucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,2 1' the D.C. Circuit, focusing
on "(1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2)
204. See id. at 5 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2).
205. Id at 126.
206. Id
207. Id at 126 n.162 (internal citations omitted).
208. Id at 137.
209. Id
210. Id at 138-41.
211. 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of
those decisions,"212 held that Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") personnel
involved in handing appeals and collections ("Appeals" personnel) were not
officers. The court concluded that "we can assume here that the issue of a
person's tax liability is substantively significant enough to meet factor
(1),"213 but the actual authority of the personnel in question was cabined:
The office is authorized to compromise disputed tax liability on the basis
of its probabilistic estimates of the hazards of litigation. Thus, if Appeals
estimates that the IRS's chances of prevailing on a disputed point of law
are 60%, it may agree to accept only 60% of the liability that turns on the
point.214
Moreover, in making decisions, "[the office of] Appeals is subject to
consultation requirements, to guidelines, and to supervision."2 15
Likewise, United States v. CisneroS216 involved an Appointments Clause
challenge to deputies to and associates of an independent counsel, who
appointed them.217 The court held that the deputies and associates were
employees, not "officers," because they were not appointed pursuant to a
federal statute, there was no statutory definition of their duties, and "the
ultimate prosecutorial decisions still rest with the Independent Counsel
himself." 2 18
The upshot of these cases is that there are no bright-line standards for
determining whether someone is an officer, rather than an employee, and
therefore must be appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause.2 19
The common elements of an officer appear to be (a) that the tenure be
continuous (at least for a period of time), (b) that the duties involve the
exercise of discretion, (c) that the duties involve relatively important
decisions on behalf of the Government, and (d) that the performance of these
212. Id at 1133; see also Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052-53 (2018) (stating that
the first two criteria were later approved of in Lucia, but the Court read Freytag as
"explicitly reject[ing the] theory that final decisionmaking [sic] authority is a sine qua
non of officer status."); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1183-84 (10th Cir.
2016), cert. deniedsub nom. SEC v. Bandimere, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) ("Final decision-
making power is relevant in determining whether a public servant exercises ignificant
authority. But that does not mean every inferior officer must possess final decision-
making power. Freytag's holding undermines that contention.").
213. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.
214. Id at 1134.
215. Id
216. United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 1998).
217. Id at 22.
218. Id at 24.
219. See Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133; Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
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duties is not subject to extensive supervision by a superior official. 22 0
The MSRB's role, unlike the FEC's, is limited to rule-making, but hat is
one of the powers of the FEC that resulted, in Buckley, in a finding that the
method of appointing four of the FEC's members was unconstitutional.22 1
Congress entrusted rule-making authority to the MSRB over an important
segment of the securities markets. Its members serve for continuous terms.
By definition, promulgating rules involves the exercise of discretion. The
SEC must approve MSRB rules, but its members are not subject to detailed
"supervision" by the SEC. These factors are likely enough to qualify MSRB
members (if the MSRB is deemed for constitutional purposes to be a public
entity) as officers, not employees. Since new MSRB members are appointed
by existing members - and not the President, the courts, or the head of a
department - this conclusion would mean that the method of appointing
MSRB members violates the Appointments Clause.
VI. DOES THE WAY IN WHICH THE MSRB'S MEMBERS CAN BE REMOVED
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?
At the other end of the spectrum from the power of appointment is the
power to remove. Assuming, again, that, despite its form, the MSRB is a
public entity, this requires deciding whether the procedure for removal of
MSRB Board members is unconstitutional.
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,2 2 2 the Court held the procedure for removal of members of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") 2 23 was an
unconstitutional infringement on the President's responsibilities.2 24 PCAOB
members, whom the Court held were "officers of the United States," were
removable only by the SEC - and then for what the Court described as "an
unusually high standard that must be met before Board members may be
removed," i.e., "willful violations of the Act, Board rules, or the securities
laws; willful abuse of authority; or unreasonable failure to enforce
compliance."225 The Court found that members of the SEC may not be
removed by the President except for cause.226 The Court then characterized
220. See Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133; Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
221. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
222. 561 U.S. 477, 503 (2010).
223. Created by Congress, the PCAOB is "charged with enforcing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the securities laws, the Commission's rules, its own rules, and professional
accounting standards." Id. at 485.
224. Id at 484.
225. Id at 503.
226. Id
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this contraption as "dual for-cause limitations on the removal of [PCAOB]
Board members."2 27 Given that the President has no direct role in the
appointment or removal of MSRB members, who may be removed by the
SEC for essentially the same level of "cause" for which PCAOB members
may be removed, 228 does the holding in Free Enterprise dictate the same
conclusion with respect to the MSRB?
The Constitution provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President,"22 9 who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . ." The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he vesting of the
executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to
execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could not execute the
laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates."23 0 And,
concomitant with the power to execute the law through others came the
power to appoint these subordinates and the power to remove them:
As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed,
the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that
as part of his executive power he should select those who were to act for
him under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further
implication must be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting
removals, that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for
whom he cannot continue to be responsible.231
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized limits on the doctrine that the
President must have the unfettered authority to remove subordinate officials,
i.e., without cause.23 2
As noted, the holding in Free Enterprise was based on the Court's finding
that the President may not remove SEC Commissioners except for cause.
227. Id. at 492.
228. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (d)(3) (2018) (establishing criteria for removal of
PCAOB members), with 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(8) (establishing criteria for removal of
MSRB members).
229. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
230. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (explaining that an Act of
Congress requiring Senate consent to President's removal of postmaster violated the
Constitution's vesting of that power in President).
23 1. Id.
232. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (holding that both
sustained similar restrictions on power of principal executive officers, responsible to
President - to remove their own inferiors); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (permitting elimination of President's authority to remove




But the statute creating the SEC is silent on removal of Commissioners233
and the Court, in Free Enterprise, performed no analysis of that issue, basing
its analysis and holding on the parties' agreement.234 This was one of the
bases of a vigorous dissent from Justice Breyer.235 It was unquestionably a
thin reed on which to lean a judicial determination that the PCAOB statute
is unconstitutional.236
Nevertheless, in Free Enterprise, at least, the parties' agreement sufficed
to prove the basis for the Court's holding that the arrangements violated the
Constitution's separation of powers.23 7 Is there a basis to distinguish the
removal provisions for the MSRB and that for the PCAOB if, as it appears,
the two provisions are substantially identical to each other? A preliminary
issue is how the Court would deal this time with the fact that the Exchange
Act is silent on the removal of SEC Commissioners. Would the parties
stipulate, as the parties did in Free Enterprise, that SEC Commissioners are
removable only for cause, and, if so, would a future Court accept and rely on
that stipulation? If there is no such stipulation or the Court declines to
proceed on the basis of a stipulation, would the Court hold on its own
analysis that Congress so intended despite its silence on the issue in enacting
(and not amending) the Exchange Act? One can only speculate on these
233. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
234. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487
(2010) (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) ("The
parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President
except under the Humphrey's Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office,' . . . and we decide the case with that understanding.").
235. Id. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("How can the Court simply assume without
deciding that the SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only 'for cause?' . . .
Unless the Commissioners themselves are in fact protected by a 'for cause' requirement,
the Accounting Board statute, on the Court's own reasoning, is not constitutionally
defective.").
236. Several commentators have questioned the Court's acceptance of a stipulation of
law as the basis of the Free Enterprise decision. See Note, The SECIs Not an Independent
Agency, 126 HARV. L. Rev. 781, 793 (2013) (criticizing the Court for proceeding on the
basis of a stipulation of the law and arguing that "interpreted in light of the text,
prevailing rules of construction, and legislative history, the 1934 Act made SEC
commissioners removable at will."); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L.
REv. 1191, 1195 (2011) (finding that the Court's acceptance of the parties' stipulation is
acceptable, if not laudable, but concluding that "Justice Breyer and Samahon have a
point," and asking "[i]sn't it the height of judicial activism to declare a federal statute
unconstitutional based on quite possibly false assumptions about the state of the law?");
Tuan Samahon, A Whopper of an Assumption in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 8, 2010), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/20 1 /0
3/a-whopper-of-an-assumption-in-free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaob.html ("Since when can
parties stipulate to different statutory language than that which was duly enacted and the
Court go along with it?").
237. Free Enter. Fund. 561 U.S. at 492. 498.
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questions, but it seems likely that the U.S. will not argue that SEC
Commissioners are removable at will.
Let us assume, therefore, that the Court would conclude that SEC
members are removable only for cause. Would there be any basis to
differentiate the MSRB from the PCAOB? The MSRB has one mandatory
function, rulemaking, and one permissive function, "establish[ing]
information systems."238  The PCAOB "promulgates auditing and ethics
standards, performs routine inspections of all accounting firms, demands
documents and testimony, and initiates formal investigations and
disciplinary proceedings."23 9 Does the breadth of the PCAOB's authority
serve to distinguish it from the MSRB with respect to the application of the
holding in Free Enterprise to the latter entity? It does not appear so, since
the ratio decidendi in that case was limited to the conclusion that the two
layers of for-cause removal constituted an unconstitutional limitation on the
President's removal power and did not, on its face, depend on the nature or
scope of the PCAOB's duties.240
But take note of this dictum, appearing immediately after the holding241 in
Free Enterprise that the removal provisions of the PCAOB statute are
separable from the rest of the statute:
It is true that the language providing for good-cause removal is only one
of a number of statutory provisions that, working together, produce a
constitutional violation. In theory, perhaps, the Court might blue-pencil a
sufficient number of the Board's responsibilities so that its members
would no longer be "Officers of the United States." Or we could restrict
the Board's enforcement powers, so that it would be a purely
recommendatory panel. Or the Board members could in future be made
removable by the President, for good cause or at will. But such editorial
freedom-far more extensive than our holding today-belongs to the
Legislature, not the Judiciary. Congress of course remains free to pursue
any of these options going forward.242
We cannot ignore this dictum, but it is not clear what to make of it. The
Court speaks of "a constitutional violation," but the only constitutional
violation found by the Court in Free Enterprise was the restriction on the
President's removal power.243  Do the recited statutory provisions offer
additional bases, besides the restriction on the President's removal power,
238. 15 U.S.C. 78o-4(b)(3) (2018) (emphasis added).
239. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 485.
240. See id. at 497-98.
241. Id at 508-09.
242. Id at 509-10.
243. Id at 498 (emphasis added).
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for finding the statute unconstitutional, and, if so, what are these bases? Or
do they simply provide additional grounds for finding the restrictions on
removal unconstitutional? It is difficult to answer these questions because
of the nature of the cited provisions and the failure of the Court to explain
their significance. Thus, the dictum raises the question of whether the MSRB
members are "officers of the United States," as the parties in Free Enterprise
agreed was the case with respect to the members of the PCAOB.244
However, this issue has traditionally gone not to the removal power but to
another issue raised by the petitioner in Free Enterprise (and rejected by the
Free Enterprise Court) - the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,245
which I discussed, above, in Part V. And of what import is the Court's
comment that "we could restrict the Board's enforcement powers, so that it
would be a purely recommendatory panel"246 to the constitutional issue
raised in Free Enterprise (the restriction on the power of the President to
remove PCAOB members)? Logically it would appear none, yet it might
bear on whether the MSRB statute violates the Appointments Clause.
In sum, although the MSRB has none of the PCAOB's authority to inspect,
investigate and prosecute, these issues do not appear logically relevant to the
holding in Free Enterprise, but the absence of any explanation for the
passage containing this dictum leaves this question unanswered. On balance,
it would appear that the holding in Free Enterprise would dictate a like result
in the case of the MSRB.
VII. REMEDIES
A postscript to this analysis is an exploration of the appropriate remedy
were the Court to find the MSRB statute unconstitutional in any respect. I
believe that it is impossible to analyze this issue fully without presupposing
the specific ground or grounds on which a holding of unconstitutionality
might be based. Nonetheless, some tentative conclusions can safely be
expressed.
The Free Enterprise Court held that the offending provisions could be
stripped from the statute without invalidating the entire statute because "[t]he
remaining provisions are not 'incapable of functioning independently,' and
nothing in the statute's text or historical context makes it 'evident' that
Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the Constitution, would
have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose members are removable at
will." 24 7 The Court recognized that determining what Congress would have
244. Id. at 477.
245. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976).
246. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
247. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508-09 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
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done had it not chosen a particular method of removing officials "can
sometimes be elusive."24 8
In actuality, the analysis of the appropriate remedy when a statute has been
declared unconstitutional is a bit more complicated than the straight-forward
analysis described by the majority in Free Enterprise.249 Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England,2 50 on which the Court relied in Free
Enterprise,25' involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute
requiring pre-abortion notice to the parents of a pregnant minor.25 2 The
lower courts found the statute unconstitutional for failure to adequately
protect the health of the minor and enjoined the statute in its entirety.253 The
Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine the intent of
the State Legislature: whether they intended that the courts could enjoinjust
the unconstitutional application of the statute and preserve the remaining
portions of the statute.254 The key finding in Ayotte was that "[o]nly a few
applications of New Hampshire's parental notification statute would present
a constitutional problem."255 For this reason, the Court saw no need to throw
out the entire statute, unless, of course, that was the way the legislature
wanted it: thus, the remand.256 Similarly, in Buckley, the Court found that
portions of the PCAOB's duties did not mandate application of the
Appointments Clause, in that they were, in effect, an adjunct to Congress'
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
248. Id at 509 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983)).
249. Compare id. at 508 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
504 (1932)) ("[T]he 'normal rule' is 'that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course."'), with Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S.
320, 329-30 (2006) (discussing three interrelated principles inform our approach to
remedies: first, do not attempt to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary
because unconstitutionality frustrates the legislative intent; second, because
constitutional mandate and institutional competence are limited, the court is against
rewriting state law to make the law constitutional in an effort to salvage it; and, third,
remedy is about legislative intent, because a court may not grant a remedy to circumvent
the intent of the legislature).
250. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
251. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508.
252. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 332 (holding that "either an injunction prohibiting
unconstitutional applications or a holding that consistency with legislative intent requires
invalidating the statute in toto should obviate any concern about the Act's life
exception").
253. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331 (agreeing with New Hampshire that the lower courts
need not have invalidated the law wholesale).





own core duties.257 By contrast, what MSRB powers would be left to carve
out were the Court to hold that the creation of the agency was constitutionally
infirm insofar as it related to the only mandatory authority - rulemaking -
vested in the agency? This points to the conclusion that there would be no
way to preserve the MSRB on the basis of such a finding.
Another relevant issue, not mentioned in Free Enterprise, is whether the
statute in question contains a severability clause - stating that if any
provision is declared invalid, the remainder remains in effect.25 8 The absence
of such a clause creates a presumption against severability.259 The Exchange
Act contains a severability provision, which provides: "If any provision of
this chapter, or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the
application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as
to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby."2 60 This provision
would not appear to reverse the presumption against severability, inasmuch
as if the MSRB is held to be unconstitutional under any of the three potential
sources of unconstitutionality discussed in this article, it does not appear
possible to separate one "provision" of section 78o-4 from another. If the
architecture of the MSRB violated the Constitution, then it would appear that
the entirety of Congress' action must be voided.
Given that the exact ramifications of a decision that the creation of the
MSRB or its architecture violates the U.S. Constitution cannot be predicted
without knowing the grounds for such a decision, while I do not intend this
summary to be dispositive of the severability issue, I assert that it is not far
from a foregone conclusion that, given the differences between the MSRB
and the PCAOB, the MSRB would survive under the current legislative
scheme.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
258. See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78gg (2018) (noting that the Exchange Act
contains a severability provision stating that "if any provision of this chapter, or the
application of such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to persons or
circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected
thereby"); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936) (determining a
relevant issue, not mentioned in Free Enterprise, which is whether the statute in question
contains a severability clause - stating that if any provision is declared invalid, the
remainder remains in effect; ultimately, the Court held that the absence of such a clause
creates a presumption against severability).
259. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 312 (stating the various ways to determine whether
severability was intended including the non-statutory rule, where the burden is upon the
supporter of the legislation to show the separability of the provisions involved and the
statutory rule, where the burden is shifted to the assailant to show their inseparability).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78gg.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A serious argument can be made that Congress acted unconstitutionally
when it mandated the creation of the MSRB. First, it can be plausibly argued
that vesting exclusive authority to promulgate rules in what is, ostensibly, a
private entity, is a violation of due process (or, alternatively, a violation of a
prohibition against vesting such authority in a private entity). Second, the
fact that new members of the MSRB are appointed by its existing members
strongly points to a finding of violation of the appointments clause. Third,
the decision in Free Enterprise holding a "dual for-cause limitations on the
removal of Board members" unconstitutional should dictate a comparable
result. Finally, the consequences of a decision finding the statutory scheme
unconstitutional on any of these three grounds include the very real
possibility that the entire statute would be voided. All these issues await
judicial interpretation, and, certainly, additional scholarly analysis.

